| 独立董事对关联交易监管的实证研究——来自深市A股上市公司的证据 |
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| 引用本文： | 申富平,李自娟. 独立董事对关联交易监管的实证研究——来自深市A股上市公司的证据[J]. 河北经贸大学学报, 2009, 30(3) |
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| 作者姓名： | 申富平 李自娟 |
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| 作者单位： | 河北经贸大学,校长办公室,河北,石家庄,050061;河北经贸大学,会计学院,河北,石家庄,050061 |
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| 摘 要： | 独立董事薪酬激励、出席董事会比例与关联交易水平负相关,并对关联交易监管发挥了显著作用;而独立董事比例、会计专业人数和兼职数量等却未表现出对关联交易的显著影响;独立董事对关联交易的监管在一定程度上是有效的。
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| 关 键 词： | 独立董事 关联交易 监管 |
Empirical Study of the Supervision Connected Transaction by Independent Director |
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| Shen Fuping,Li Zijuan. Empirical Study of the Supervision Connected Transaction by Independent Director[J]. Journal Of Hebei University Of Economics and Trade, 2009, 30(3) |
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| Authors: | Shen Fuping Li Zijuan |
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| Abstract: | The incentive pay and attendance of board meeting is negatively related to connected transaction level and therefore effectively supervise and manage the latter.But the proportion of independent directors,number of full-time and part-time accountants does not exert substantial influence on connected transactions.In general,independent director is to some degree effective in supervising connected transactions. |
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| Keywords: | independent director connected transaction supervision |
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