| Abstract: | The article concerns three substantial aspects of the continuous discussion regarding the future ability of the pension system in Germany: The conclusions from rate of return comparisons between paygo system and fully funded system, the distribution of loads by the demography development and effects of the exertion of political influence. In a first step, the politico-economic conclusions drawn from rate of return comparisons are analysed critically. It is shown that the empirically measurable difference is nothing but a spurious reason for the introductions of a capital funded system. With help of simple economic thoughts, the second central argument for a change of system, the ?fair“ distribution of loads caused by the demographic development, turns out to be a spurious reason as well. The central problem of the pension scheme is the exertion of political influence — an aspect, which is hardly considered in the discussion. Thus it becomes clear that the problem of the pension system consists in the concrete arrangement and not in the system itself. Some approaches for the solution of this problem are pointed out. |
