双边市场、不完全信息与二级价格歧视

本文研究了双边市场二级价格歧视问题。本文构建了包括广告商、消费者、垄断平台在内的两阶段博弈模型，研究了在最优与次优情况下平台的定价机制，分析了二级价格歧视对平台利润、社会福利等的影响。研究表明：（1）“顶部无扭曲”或“底部无扭曲”并不严格成立；（2）平台对观众提供的节目质量、广告插播量均可能出现类型逆转的情况；（3）二级价格歧视会增加社会总福利；（4）“会员制”是平台可能的占优定价机制之一。

TWO SIDED MARKET,INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AND SECOND DEGREE PRICE DISCRIMINATION

This paper studies the second degree price discrimination in two sided market. This paper presents a two stage game including the advertiser, the consumer and the monopolistic platform, in which the platform's first best pricing schedule and second best pricing schedule are determined. This paper presents the distortion of the platform profit and the social welfare caused by the incomplete information and price discrimination. We find as follows: First, some distortions do not exist. Second, the type of the consumer on the program quality and the advertising level may reverse. Third, the second degree price discrimination will increase the social welfare while decrease the consumer welfare. Fourth, the membership system is one of the platform's dominant strategies.