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| 基于自由现金流量的股权激励制度探析 | |
| 引用本文： | 陈昌平. 基于自由现金流量的股权激励制度探析[J]. 商品储运与养护, 2011, 0(10) |
| 作者姓名： | 陈昌平 |
| 作者单位： | 福州大学阳光学院; |
| 摘 要： | 自由现金流量从詹森提出以来一直倍受学术界的关注,自由现金流量的存在所带来的企业所有者和经营者之间的利益冲突,其本质是委托代理问题的一个表现。要改善或解决这个问题,可以从公司治理的角度出发,引入股权激励方案,使企业经营者的利益与所有者的利益以及企业长远发展结合在一起,从而解决企业自由现金流量所带来的利益冲突问题。 |
| 关 键 词： | 自由现金流量 股权激励 委托代理 |
Analysis of Equity Incentive System Based on Free Cash Flow |
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| CHEN Chang-ping. Analysis of Equity Incentive System Based on Free Cash Flow[J]. Storage Transportation & Preservation of Commodities, 2011, 0(10) | |
| Authors: | CHEN Chang-ping |
| Affiliation: | CHEN Chang-ping(Fuzhou University Sunshine College,Fuzhou 350015,China) |
| Abstract: | Free Cash Flow(FCF) has been a persistent academic focus since it was proposed by Michael C.Jensen.It is a Principal-agent problem as manifested by the conflicts between business owners and operators caused by FCF.An effective measure to alleviate or solve the conflicts is the introduction of equity incentive program based on corporate governance,which combines the common interests of business operators and owners as well as the long-term development of corporation,and solves the conflicts caused by FCF. |
| Keywords: | free cash flow equity incentive principal-agent |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 等数据库收录！ | |