A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements |
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| Authors: | Paola Manzini Marco Mariotti |
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| Institution: | a Queen Mary, University of London, Department of Economics, Mile End Road, E1 4NS London, UK
b Department of Economics, University of Exeter, Streatham Court, Rennes Drive, Exeter EX4 4PU, UK |
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| Abstract: | We present an explicit model of firm-regulator negotiations in a market with several firms. We describe how the regulatory surplus is distributed between firms and regulator, and analyse the impact of various parameters on the resulting level of environmental regulation. Our main result is that a ‘toughest firm principle’ holds: the outcome of negotiations is essentially determined by the firm with the most aggressive attitude towards environmental control. |
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| Keywords: | Voluntary agreements Multiperson bargaining Regulation |
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