Incentives to managers or participation of farmers in China's irrigation systems: which matters most for water savings,farmer income,and poverty?

The overall goal of our article is to better understand which matters for water savings, farmer income and poverty in China's irrigation systems: incentives to managers or participation of farmers. To pursue this goal, the article has three objectives. First, we track the evolution of water management reform, examining the practice of providing incentives to managers, and increasing the participation of farmers. Second, we identify the impact of water management reform on crop water use. Specifically, we want to measure whether or not incentives to managers and farmer participation in water management institutions affect the performance of the irrigation system. Because we also are interested in the potential results of water management reform, the article explores how changes in incentives and farmer participation affect farmer income and poverty. Based on a random sample of 51 villages and 189 farmers in four large irrigation districts in Ningxia and Henan provinces, both in China's Yellow River Basin, our results show that the two major forms of water management reform, water users' associations (WUAs) and contracting, have begun to systematically replace traditional forms of collective management. Our analysis demonstrates, however, that it is not the nominal implementation of the reform that matters, but rather it is the creation of new management institutions that offer water managers monetary incentives that lead to water savings. In contrast to the original design of China's reform policies, participation of farmers has not played a role in saving water. Importantly, given China's concerns about national food production and poverty alleviation, the reductions in water, at least in our sample sites, do not lead to reductions in income and do not increase the incidence of poverty.