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心理博弈模型下的核心员工激励约束策略
引用本文:王佳宇.心理博弈模型下的核心员工激励约束策略[J].沈阳工程学院学报(社会科学版),2009,5(2).
作者姓名:王佳宇
作者单位:河北经贸大学金融学院,石家庄,050061
摘    要:核心员工是企业的重要资源,在企业中发挥核心作用,相当于委托一代理模型中的代理人.在现实中,代理人有追求公平的需要,在此前提下,可以运用Rabin的心理博弈模型对代理人约束进行完善.经过分析得出,当由激励合同、善意函数和代理人付出的努力成本共同决定的期望效用不小于保留效用时,核心员工会选择留在本企业工作,否则会选择"跳槽".在此基础上,从相应的薪酬设计和企业氛围营造等方面总结了我国企业留住核心员工的管理策略.

关 键 词:核心员工  公平  善意函数  策略

Encourage with control strategy for key staff under psychological game model
WANG Jia-yu.Encourage with control strategy for key staff under psychological game model[J].Journal of Shenyang Institute of Engineering:Social Sciences,2009,5(2).
Authors:WANG Jia-yu
Institution:School of Finance;Hebei University of Economics & Business;Shijiazhuang 050061;China
Abstract:Key staff is the important resource of enterprise,plays a key role in the enterprise,and is equivalent to the agent of agency by agreement model.In reality,agent has the requirement to pursue equity,under this precondition,can perfect agent control by Rabin's psychological game model.Analysis shows when expectation effectiveness determined by encourage contract,well-meant function and agent's effort cost is not less than reservation effectiveness,key staff will choose to stay in present enterprise,otherwise...
Keywords:key staff  equity  well-meant function  strategy  
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