基于跨期选择、价格歧视的供给者与消费者博弈

消费者具有为未来需要储存的倾向,更愿意通过储存获得跨期套利。本文通过建立跨期选择模型,运用不完全信息静态博弈的方法研究供给者和消费者跨期选择行为,认为供给者收益增加增强了供给者改善储存工艺、延长价格歧视行为的动机;消费者随着收入的增加对价格变化的敏感度降低,储存倾向也降低,消费者跨期选择效用变化不显著,同时社会福利也趋于增加。

Game of Suppliers and Consumers Based on Intertemporal Choice and Price Discrimination

Consumers have a tendency to save what they own today for the future needs.Therefore,they are more likely to gain intertemporal arbitrage by storage.The paper establishes a intertemporal-choosing model and uses an incomplete information static game theory to study the behaviors of providers and consumers.It explains the motivation of providers′ improving storage process and extend price discrimination is their increasing of benefits.As the increasing of consumers′ income,their sensitivity to price changes and storage tendency are declining;the utility of consumers′ intertemporal choice changes little and social welfare tends to increase.