Equilibrium selection in signaling games with teams: Forward induction or faster adaptive learning? |
| |
| Authors: | David J Cooper John H Kagel |
| |
| Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, Florida State University, United States;2. Department of Economics, Ohio State University, United States;1. Paris School of Economics, University Paris 1, Pantheon-Sorbonne, France;2. Santa Fe Institute, United States;3. Central European University, Hungary;1. Johann Bernoulli Institute for Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Groningen, P.O. Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen, The Netherlands;2. Department of Mathematics, Quy Nhon University, 170 An Duong Vuong, Quy Nhon, Binh Dinh, Viet Nam;3. Department of Electronics and Communication Engineering, Dogus University, Kadikoy 34722, Istanbul, Turkey;1. Department of Automation, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China;2. Department of Communication, Shanghai University of Electric Power, Shanghai, China |
| |
| Abstract: | Teams are shown to violate the most basic of equilibrium refinements in signaling games: single-round deletion of dominated strategies (part of the Cho–Kreps intuitive criteria). This is important because, to the extent that teams can be easily induced to violate the most basic of equilibrium refinements even under a “best case” scenario (teams that rapidly develop strategic play in games of this sort), it implies that one must rely on learning models, and past empirical research with these models, when predicting equilibrium outcomes. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
