A common value auction model with endogenous entry and information acquisition

Summary Much of the auction literature assumes both a fixed number of bidders and a fixed information setting. This sidesteps the important and often costly decisions a potential bidder must make prior to an auction: Should I enter and, if I do, what level of resources should I expend evaluating the good prior to bidding? We answer these questions for a stylized information model of a common value auction. The expected selling price is shown to be the expected value of the good minus the expected aggregate entry and information costs of the bidders. Thus, the seller indirectly pays for these costs to the bidders. There are auctions where the seller seemingly restricts the bidders' information expenditures. While this restriction does influence the entry decision, we demonstrate that the overall effect can be to improve the selling price. Finally, the probability of entry and the chosen accuracy of the information are never more in the second-price auction than in the first-price auction, and the seller prefers the second-price auction.We are grateful for the comments and suggestions of seminar participants at the University of British Columbia, Dartmouth College, the University of Wisconsin, Yale University, and the International Conference on Game Theory and Economics at SUNY Stony Brook.