| 双边道德风险条件下科技人员的激励薪酬契约 |
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| 引用本文： | 李廉水,岳贤平,崔维军.双边道德风险条件下科技人员的激励薪酬契约[J].财经研究,2008,34(9). |
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| 作者姓名： | 李廉水 岳贤平 崔维军 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 南京信息工程大学,经济管理学院,江苏,南京,210044
2. 南京信息工程大学,经济管理学院,江苏,南京,210044;东南大学,经济管理学院,江苏,南京,210096 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金，安徽省自然科学基金，中国科协重大政策课题，江苏省高校哲学社会科学重大项目，中国博士后科学基金 |
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| 摘 要： | 文章利用现代契约经济学的基本理论,对双边道德风险条件下科技人员的线性激励薪酬契约设计的内在规律进行了分析.分析表明,在理论和实践两方面,线性激励薪酬契约都有广泛存在的合理性.同时,文章根据研究结论并结合中国实际,给出了相应的规范性建议.
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| 关 键 词： | 科技人员 双边道德风险 线性激励薪酬契约 |
On the Incentive Salary Contracts for Technician with Double-sided Moral Hazard |
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| LI Lian-shui,YUE Xian-ping,CUI Wei-jun.On the Incentive Salary Contracts for Technician with Double-sided Moral Hazard[J].The Study of Finance and Economics,2008,34(9). |
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| Authors: | LI Lian-shui YUE Xian-ping CUI Wei-jun |
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| Institution: | LI Lian-shui1,YUE Xian-ping2,CUI Wei-jun2(1.School of Economics , Management,Nanjing University of InformationScience , Technology,Nanjing 210044,China,2.School of Economics ,Management,Southeast University,Nanjing 210096,China) |
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| Abstract: | Using basic theories of modern contract economics,this paper analyzes the inner rule of linear salary incentive contracts for technician under the conditions of bilateral moral hazard.It shows that linear salary incentive contracts are widely in demand.Finally,this paper provides some canonical countermeasures and suggestions according to the reality of China. |
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| Keywords: | technician bilateral moral hazard linear salary incentive contract |
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