The effect of luck framing on distributional preferences |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Business Administration Program, Pontifical Catholic University of Parana, Curitiba, PR, Brazil;2. Department of Economics, Finance and Marketing, Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, United States;1. Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, Maynooth University, Ireland;2. EPPA SA, Place du Luxembourg 2, 1050 Bruxelles, Belgium;1. Banco de Portugal and NOVA SBE;2. Bank of Italy;1. Department of Biomedical Sciences and Public Health, Marche Polytechnic University, Via Tronto 10/A, Torrette di Ancona 60126, Italy;2. Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and the Study of Religion, LMU Munich, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, Munich 80539, Germany;3. Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, LMU Munich, Leopoldstrasse 13, Munich 80802, Germany |
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| Abstract: | This paper experimentally investigated luck framing. Specifically, we analyzed the difference between being assigned an advantageous role in a distribution game and being assigned the same role while being explicitly told that you were lucky to be in that favorable position. We tested this difference by implementing a dictator game and a no-veto-cost ultimatum game. We observed that: a) dictators transferred larger amounts in the game when they were explicitly told they were lucky to be the dictator compared to dictators who did not receive this message, and b) responders in the no-veto-cost ultimatum game who were explicitly told they were lucky to be in that role were significantly less likely to reject a particular offer compared to responders in the game who did not receive this message. The combination of these results is consistent with the hypothesis that people are more likely to behave in a more prosocial and egalitarian manner when they are reminded that they are lucky to be in a particular position. |
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