新增食品厂商、监管规制与食品安全

基于不完全信息理论下责任制度分析框架，从规制者、原有食品厂商、新增食品厂商和消费者的四方博弈出发，逐步分解模型中多方博弈主体的行为、收益以及最优食品安全水平下的约束条件和均衡解。研究发现：政府在把握规制的度的情况下，食品厂商类别、规制次数对于政府客观公正的监管规制无影响。提高不同食品厂商的食品合格率是增加消费者满意度、支付意愿以及食品消费规模的关键举措。同时，保障政府监管和信息传递的有效性是四方博弈主体收益增加的前提。原有食品厂商和新增食品厂商之间在食品价格、食品质量以及消费者期望效用方面存在正相关关系。

New Food Manufacturers,Regulation and Food Safety

Based on the responsibility system framework of incomplete information theory, in view of quartet game among the regulator, the original food manufacturer, the new food manufacturer and the consumer, this paper conducts a step-by-step decomposition of different parties’ behaviors and earnings, and tears down the constraint and the equilibrium in the optimal food safety level. The study finds that if the government can handle the extent of regulation well, the type of the food manufa-turers, be they new or original, and the frequency of regulation have no effect on the objective and fair regulation of the gov-ernment. To improve the food qualification rate of the original( new) food manufacturers is the key to enhance consumers’ sat-isfaction degree, payment willingness and food consumption scale. At the same time, guaranteeing the effectiveness govern-ment regulation and information transfer is the precondition to increase the revenue of the four parties of the game. There is a positive corrlation between the food price, the food safety level and consumer’s expectation utility of the original food manufac-turers and those of the new food manufacturers.