Competitive price-matching guarantees under imperfect store availability

This paper analyzes the role of verification of product availability in the context of competitive price-matching guarantees (PMGs). PMGs involve a retailer matching any lower price offered by competition for an identical item. Until now, researchers focused on the scenario where customers can receive the lower price with a simple proof (e.g., weekly flyers). However, in reality, retailers reserve the right to verify the availability at the competitor location; if the product is not available there, then the price-match request might be declined. We develop a price competition model to investigate the effects of verification of availability on price decisions and profit levels of competing retailers. In our model, demand is driven by the availability levels of retailers as well as the price-search cost and store-switching cost incurred by customers. Price-search cost leads to two customer segments: uninformed ones who have no knowledge about prices, and informed ones who are knowledgeable about prices. On the other hand, store-switching cost determines how many customers search for the product at an alternative location because of high price or unavailability at their preferred retailers. Our analysis reveals, among others, that the outcome of availability verification is linked to three factors: price-search cost, store-switching cost, and the reservation prices of customer segments. Verification of availability allows retailers to price discriminate customers who could not be discriminated otherwise, specifically those belonging to the informed customer segment. Furthermore, it is a significant profit-enhancing mechanism only if there are switching customers in the market. Interestingly, even though customers view the verification of availability as a hassle, it can actually result in them paying lower retail prices by increasing the level of retail price competition.