寻利还是寻租——补贴制度对企业投资的影响

文章首先根据现有研究对市场中存在的功能性、选择性两种类型的政府补贴进行区分,并运用固定效应、logit与tobit模型研究了我国A股上市公司2008-2016年政府补贴对企业投资决策的影响,发现选择性补贴具有明显的人际关系化交换特征;通过对企业是否具有寻租行为与政治联系的分样本检验,发现在人际关系化下,选择性补贴具有寻租性,会占用生产性资本,表现为投资不足,而功能性补贴具有寻利性,普遍易使生产投资过度;在产业层面,通过研究两类补贴的分布特征对行业结构的影响,发现选择性补贴会更大程度地降低市场竞争性,通过logit中介效应模型与交互项检验,发现前期选择性补贴由于提高了企业投资不足的概率,增加了市场份额下降的可能性,从而市场竞争性降低;然而,尽管投资不足会增加企业退市风险,但寻租下的选择性补贴会减少企业退出市场的可能性,因此,市场竞争机制易被人际关系化下的选择性补贴扰乱。

Profit-Seeking or Rent-Seeking: The Influence of Subsidy System on Enterprise's Investment

According to the existing researches, we distinguish selectivity subsidy from functional subsidy among the government subsidies. Then, using Chinese A-share listed companies data to study the government subsidy impact on the enterprise investment decision by the fixed effects, logit and tobit model from 2008 to 2016,we found that selective subsidies has obvious interpersonal exchange characteristics; Based on the sample test of whether an enterprise has rent-seeking behavior and political connection, it is found that under the interpersonal relationship, selective subsidies are rent-seeking and will occupy productive capital, which is manifested as insufficient investment, while functional subsidies are profit-seeking and generally lead to excessive investment. At the industry level,by studying the impact of distribution features of the two kinds subsidies on the industry structure, we found that the selective subsidies would reduce more market competitive, by logit-intermediary effect model and interactive items inspection, we found that early selective subsidies due to declining market share after increasing the probability of insufficient investment, reduce market competitive; However, although insufficient investment will increase the risk of enterprise delisting, the selective subsidy under rent-seeking will keep enterprises from exit. Therefore,the market competition mechanism is easily disturbed by the selective subsidy under interpersonal relationship.