股权激励与代理成本

传统以管理费用率作为代理成本的替代不能恰当地反映管理者在职消费和职务侵占的真实水平,本文用经过Jones模型纠正的费用率作为代理成本的替代,考察了所有权性质、总经理持股与否及持股比例对代理成本的影响。本文提供了私有制下总经理适当持股有利于降低代理成本的可靠证据,为中国上市公司即将展开的股权激励计划提供证据的支持。

Equity Incentive and Agency Costs

Using discretionary expenses rate estimated by Jones Model as proxies for agency cost, this paper investigates the impacts of ownership character and stocks held by top managers on agency cost. We find that agency costs are lower in private owned firms that top managers hold suitable shares. This suggests that equity incentive scheme could be an effective way to reduce the agency costs of the listed companies in our country.