Financial Contracting with Optimistic Entrepreneurs

Optimistic beliefs are a source of nonpecuniary benefits forentrepreneurs that can explain the "Private Equity Puzzle."This paper looks at the effects of entrepreneurial optimismon financial contracting. When the contract space is restrictedto debt, we show the existence of a separating equilibrium inwhich optimists self-select into short-term debt and realistsinto long-term debt. Long-term debt is optimal for a realistentrepreneur as it smooths payoffs across states of nature.Short-term debt is optimal for optimists for two reasons: (i)"bridging the gap in beliefs" by letting the entrepreneur takea bet on his project’s success, and (ii) letting the investorimpose adaptation decisions in bad states. We test our theory on a large data set of French entrepreneurs.First, in agreement with the psychology literature, we findthat biases in beliefs may be (partly) explained by individualcharacteristics and tend to persist over time. Second, as predictedby our model, we find that short-term debt is robustly correlatedwith "optimistic" expectation errors, even controlling for firmrisk and other potential determinants of short-term leverage.