The effects of bureaucracy on political accountability and electoral selection |
| |
| Institution: | 1. Cologne Center for Comparative Politics (CCCP), University of Cologne, Herbert-Lewin-Str. 2, 50931, Cologne, Germany;2. Cologne Center for Comparative Politics (CCCP), Cologne Graduate School (CGS), University of Cologne, Herbert-Lewin-Str. 2, 50931, Cologne, Germany;1. Ariel University, Israel;2. The Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel;3. Stony Brook University, NY, USA;4. Harvard University, USA;1. University of Lyon, UJM Saint-Etienne, GATE (UMR 5824), France;2. CREM (UMR CNRS 6211), University of Caen Normandie and Condorcet Center, France;3. CNRS and Beta (UMR 7522), University of Strasbourg, France;4. CNRS and Paris School of Economics (UMR 8545), France;1. Department of Economics, University of California, Irvine, United States;2. College of Economics, Zhejiang University, 38 Zheda Road, Xihu, Hangzhou 310027, Zhejiang, China;1. Baylor University, USA;2. The University of Chicago, USA;3. George Mason University, USA;1. Bank of Italy, Directorate General for Economics, Statistics and Research, Structural Economic Analysis Directorate, Law and Economics Division, Via Nazionale 91, 00187, Rome, Italy;2. Bank of Italy, Directorate General for Economics, Statistics and Research, Florence Economic Research Unit, Via dell''Oriuolo 37/39, 50122, Firenze, Italy;3. CRELI (Catholic University Milan), Italy |
| |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how bureaucracy affects political accountability and electoral selection, using a three-tier political agency model consisting of voters, politicians and bureaucrats. In the model’s hierarchy, politicians are constrained by elections while bureaucrats are controlled by budgets. If voters and bureaucrats prefer different types of politicians (i.e. they have a conflict of interests), incumbents pass oversized budgets to prevent bureaucrats from engaging in strategic behaviours that damage incumbents’ reputations. If, instead, voters and bureaucrats prefer the same type of politicians (i.e. they have an alignment of interests), bureaucrats cannot obtain a concession from politicians. In the latter case, however, bureaucrats send voters a credible signal regarding an incumbent’s type, which improves electoral selection. This paper also shows that political appointment systems improve political accountability in the conflict-of-interests case while they weaken electoral selection in the alignment-of-interests case. |
| |
| Keywords: | Bureaucracy Political accountability Electoral selection Political appointment |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
