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A new look for Stackelberg-Cournot equilibria in oligopolistic markets
Authors:Sjur D Flåm  Lina Mallozzi  Jacqueline Morgan
Institution:(1) Department of Economics, University of Bergen 5007, NORWAY (e-mail: Sjur.Flaam@econ.uib.no) , NO;(2) Dipartimento di Matematica e Applicazioni, Università di Napoli Federico II, V. Claudio, 21, 80125 Napoli, ITALY (e-mail: mallozzi@unina.it) , IT;(3) Dipartimento di Matematica e Statistica, Università di Napoli Federico II, V. Cintia, 80126 Napoli, ITALY (e-mail: morgan@unina.it) , IT
Abstract:Summary. This note deals with Cournot type oligopolies in which the market clearing price occasionally may be non-unique. A Stackelberg leading producer is present. Given that setting we explore continuity properties of the followers' reaction and provide sufficient conditions for existence of equilibrium. Received: June 20, 2000; revised version: April 24, 2001
Keywords:and Phrases: Cournot oligopoly  Stackelberg solutions  Nash equilibrium  closed correspondences  
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