首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     


The Discursive Dilemma in Monetary Policy
Authors:Carl Andreas Claussen  Øistein Røisland
Affiliation:1. Sveriges Riksbank, , SE‐10337 Stockholm, Sweden;2. Norges Bank, , NO‐0107 Oslo, Norway
Abstract:The discursive dilemma implies that the decision of a board depends on whether the board votes directly on the decision (conclusion‐based procedure) or votes on the premises for the decision (premise‐based procedure). We derive results showing when the discursive dilemma might occur. Under majority voting, a discursive dilemma can occur either (i) if the relationship between the premise and the decision is non‐monotonic, or (ii) if the board members have different judgments on at least two of the premises. Normatively, a premise‐based procedure tends to give better decisions when there is disagreement on parameters of the model.
Keywords:Discursive dilemma  monetary policy  monetary policy committee  policy boards  D71  E52  E58
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号