国有企业高管薪酬结构对费用粘性的影响研究

本文以2007～2010年国有控股上市公司为样本,研究国有企业高管薪酬结构中短期货币性报酬水平对费用粘性的影响。研究结果显示,当国有企业高管薪酬结构中短期货币性报酬的比例较高时,高管会在业务量下降时迅速调整企业资源,从而导致较低水平的费用粘性;而当高管薪酬结构中短期货币性报酬的比例较低时,面临企业业务量的下降,高管将会延迟企业资源的调整,以待业务量回升。该研究结论表明,国有企业可以通过调整高管薪酬结构来影响费用粘性水平,从而为国有企业费用管理提供了新的思路。

The Impact of the Structure of Executive Compensation on Cost Stickiness in the State-owned Enterprises

Based on the data of State-owned Enterprises from 2007 to 2010,this paper studies the impact of short-term monetary compensation on cost stickiness.The empirical test shows that when the short-term monetary compensation ratio is high in the compensation system,executives will cut down enterprise resources in the active economic situation decline,which resulted in a lower level of cost stickiness;while when the short-term monetary compensation ratio is low in the compensation system,executives will delay the adjustment of enterprise resources to wait for the recovery of economic situation.The results imply the State-owned Enterprises can influence the level of cost stickiness by adjusting the structure of executive compensation,which provide a new way for cost management.