Do IMF and IBRD Cause Moral Hazard and Political Business Cycles? Evidence from Panel Data |
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Authors: | Dreher Axel Vaubel Roland |
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Affiliation: | (1) Fakultät für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Universität Mannheim, D-68131 Mannheim, Germany |
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Abstract: | Using panel data for 94 countries in 1975–97, we estimate OLS, 2SLS and GMM regressions to explain IMF and IBRD lending as well as monetary and fiscal policies in the recipient countries. With respect to moral hazard, we find that a country's government budget deficit and its rate of monetary expansion are higher the larger its borrowing potential in the Fund. New net lending of the Bank (relative to GDP) raises monetary expansion but lowers budget deficits of the recipient countries while new net credit from the Fund is associated with less expansionary policies. As for political business cycles, our evidence indicates that new net credits from the IMF are significantly larger prior to elections and that borrowing from the IBRD is significantly smaller after elections. |
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Keywords: | IMF programs IBRD programs political business cycles moral hazard |
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