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Stock options,restricted stock,salary, or bonus? Managing CEO compensation to maximize organizational performance
Institution:1. Robert C. Vackar College of Business & Entrepreneurship, The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, One West University Boulevard, Brownsville, TX 78520, U.S.A.;2. The University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX 78712, U.S.A.;3. Robert C. Vackar College of Business & Entrepreneurship, The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, Edinburg, TX 78539, U.S.A.
Abstract:CEO pay has gone through remarkable changes over the past two decades. The most striking new features have been the increased use of stock options in the early 2000s, and of restricted stock since then. Both forms of stock-based compensation are intended to resolve the agency problem that occurs when CEOs do not act in the best interests of stockholders, but each has its advantages and limitations. In this instalment of Organizational Performance, we discuss the history of their use and similarities and differences between the two, and argue that both are often overused. Bonuses based on strategic goals, on the other hand, may be underused. We conclude with a contextual approach to guide boards of directors in making choices among the forms of CEO compensation—stock options, restricted stock, salary, and bonus—to incentivize CEOs to work toward maximizing organizational performance. Briefly, stock options are most appropriate for growth firms, and restricted stock for stable firms. Both forms of stock-based compensation are more appropriate for new than for long-tenured CEOs.
Keywords:CEO compensation  Agency theory  Stock-based pay  Stock options  Restricted stock  Organizational performance
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