| 非对称信息下的审计市场:逆向选择与信号传递 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 刘馨.非对称信息下的审计市场:逆向选择与信号传递[J].财会通讯,2004(12). |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 刘馨 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 四川大学工商管理学院,四川,成都,610041 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 本文从博弈的角度对非对称信息下的审计市场进行了分析,认为目前我国的审计市场存在逆向选择效应,面临成为“柠檬市场”的威胁。审计市场要避免出现逆向选择,建立以会计师事务所品牌为手段的“信号传递机制”是必然之路。
|
| 关 键 词： | 信息不对称 逆向选择 博弈 信号传递 |
The Asymmetry Information Effect on Auditing Market: Adverse Selection and Signal Model |
| |
| Lin,Xin.The Asymmetry Information Effect on Auditing Market: Adverse Selection and Signal Model[J].Communication of Finance and Accounting,2004(12). |
| |
| Authors: | Lin Xin |
| |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the asymmetry information effect on auditing markets. The author finds in auditing market, information asymmetry will lead to adverse selection. In order to avoid adverse selection, it is essential that accounting agency should establish a signal model of quality. |
| |
| Keywords: | Information Asymmetry Adverse Selection Game Theory Signal Model |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
