Information,motivation, and control in decentralized planning: the case of discretionary managerial behavior

A simple piecewise-linear managerial incentive scheme is analyzed in a decision-making environment in which a manager is allowed some discretionary activity (effort). Initially, he must report to the planner a target that will be used subsequently to evaluate his performance. If managerial effort is chosen after the random production components are realized, this predicted target will be more realizable than one reported in the absence of such discretionary adjustment. The sensitivity of target and performance to the parameters of the incentive scheme and the manager's utility function is examined to study the planner's ability to both acquire information and motivate performance. J. Comp. Econ., Sept. 1979, 3(3), pp. 235–253. Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts.