Ambiguity in election games |
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Authors: | Enriqueta Aragonès Andrew Postlewaite |
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Institution: | (1) Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica, C.S.I.C., Campus UAB, 08193 Bellaterra, Spain (e-mail: enriqueta.aragones@uab.es) , ES;(2) Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA (e-mail: apostlew@ssc.upenn.edu) , US |
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Abstract: | We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them to increase the number of voters to whom they appeal.
We focus our analysis on two points that are central to obtain ambiguity in equilibrium: restrictions on the beliefs that
candidates can induce in voters, and intensity of voters' preferences. The first is necessary for a pure strategy equilibrium
to exist, while the second is necessary for ambiguity in equilibrium when there exists a Condorcet winner in the set of pure
alternatives (e.g. the spatial model of electoral competition), and when candidates' only objective is to win the election.
In this last case, an ambiguous candidate may offer voters with different preferences the hope that their most preferred alternative
will be implemented. We also show that if there are sufficiently many candidates or parties, ambiguity will not be possible
in equilibrium, but a larger set of possible policies increases the chance that at least one candidate will choose to be ambiguous
in equilibrium.
We would like to thank Alberto Alesina, Antonio Cabrales, Steve Coate, Olivier Compte, Tim Feddersen, Itzhak Gilboa, Joe Harrington,
Michel Le Breton, Alessandro Lizzeri, George Mailath, Steve Matthews, Steve Morris, Ignacio Ortuno, Tom Palfrey, Larry Samuelson,
Murat Sertel, Fernando Vega, Eyal Winter and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. The first author acknowledges financial
support from DGICYT-PB 95-0983. This work was done while the first author was visiting the Center in Political Economy at
Washington University, and visiting the Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences at Harvard University. Their hospitality
is gratefully acknowledged. The support of the second author's research by the National Science Foundation is also gratefully
acknowledged. |
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