| 薪酬结构与企业财务行为 |
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| 引用本文： | 李粟.薪酬结构与企业财务行为[J].南京财经大学学报,2009(2). |
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| 作者姓名： | 李粟 |
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| 作者单位： | 贵州财经学院会计学院,贵州贵阳550004 |
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| 摘 要： | 按照代理理论，有效的高管合同一方面应该能够对管理者的投资行为产生影响，另一方面，除了股东与经营者之间的代理问题之外，而且要能够缓解与债权人之间的代理问题。因此，本文通过沪市数据对高管薪酬结构、投资、以及资本结构之间的关系进行了实证检验。但是，检验结果没有完全支持相关理论。由此可以看出，中国高管薪酬合同的有效性还有待于提高。
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| 关 键 词： | 薪酬结构 投资行为 财务杠杆 资产替代 |
Compensation Structure and Financial Behavior |
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| LI Su.Compensation Structure and Financial Behavior[J].Journal of Nanjing University of Finance and Economics,2009(2). |
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| Authors: | LI Su |
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| Institution: | School of Accounting;Guizhou University of Finance and Economics;Guiyang 550004;China |
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| Abstract: | According to agency theory,an effecive contract of executive compensation should serve the function of moving the investment behavior of manager and mitigating the agency problem between stockholdings and bondholdings.In the paper,we test the relations between executive compensaion,investment and captical structure using the data from Shanghai Stock Exchange.But the result does not support the theory which show. |
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| Keywords: | Compensation Structure Investment Behavior Financial Leverage Asset Substitution |
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