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Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests

Authors:	Subhasish M. Chowdhury Roman M. Sheremeta

Affiliation:	^a School of Economics, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science, ESRC Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK ^b Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866, USA

Abstract:	We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests, and show that asymmetric equilibria arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We then present existing contests where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.

Keywords:	C62 C72 D72 D74
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