Veto players and foreign aid provision |
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Authors: | Yu Wang Shuai Jin |
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Institution: | 1. Department of Government and Public Administration, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong
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Abstract: | This study investigates how the political institutions of developed economies influence their foreign assistance. Specifically, we argue that the number of effective veto players has a negative effect on the volume of aid provision. To provide foreign assistance, the incumbent government in a donor country must have unanimous support from all effective veto players in policy making. Thus, it has more barriers to overcome when the polity is characterized by many and preference-wise heterogeneous veto players. By examining the official development assistance outflows of 27 OECD countries for the period of 1977–2006, we find empirical patterns that corroborate our argument. |
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