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Equilibrium selection in bargaining models |
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| Authors: | Ken Binmore Larry Samuelson Peyton Young |
| Affiliation: | a Department of Economics, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, UK;b Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin, 1180 Observatory Drive, Madison, WI 53706-1321, USA;c Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 21218, USA |
| Abstract: | This paper examines evolutionary equilibrium selection in bargaining models. We show that random best-response and continuous best-response learning dynamics give rise to (different) simple sufficient conditions for identifying outcomes as stochastically stable. This allows us to characterize the implications of these dynamics in simple bargaining games. |
| Keywords: | Nash demand game Contract game Evolutionary dynamics Equilibrium selection Risk dominance Best response Stochastic stability |
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