Pareto optima and equilibria when preferences are incompletely known |
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Authors: | G Carlier R-A Dana |
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Institution: | CEREMADE, UMR CNRS 7534, Université Paris IX Dauphine, Pl. de Lattre de Tassigny, 75775 Paris, Cedex 16, France |
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Abstract: | An exchange economy in which agents have convex incomplete preferences defined by families of concave utility functions is considered. Sufficient conditions for the set of efficient allocations and equilibria to coincide with the set of efficient allocations and equilibria that result when each agent has a utility in her family are provided. Welfare theorems in an incomplete preferences framework therefore hold under these conditions and efficient allocations and equilibria are characterized by first order conditions. |
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Keywords: | C62 D50 D61 D81 |
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