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团队绩效考核的博弈分析
引用本文:王鲜,张玉新,王先甲,吉海,陈智英.团队绩效考核的博弈分析[J].科技进步与对策,2007,24(1):24-27.
作者姓名:王鲜  张玉新  王先甲  吉海  陈智英
作者单位:1. 武汉大学,系统工程研究所,湖北,武汉,430072
2. 中国国电集团公司,北京,100045
摘    要:分析了常见的团队考核机制下考核博弈的纳什均衡,对常见的考核机制进行修正,引入抑制恶意评价的惩罚措施,分析了新机制下考核博弈的纳什均衡,分析结果表明,有效的考核宣传培训将会导致符合考核目标的博弈均衡结果。

关 键 词:团队  绩效考核  博弈  纳什均衡
文章编号:1001-7348(2007)01-0024-03
收稿时间:2005-11-02
修稿时间:2005-11-02

A Game Analysis of Performance Appraisal of Teams
Abstract:This paper analyzes the Nash equilibrium of appraisal game under normal appraisal mechanism which is often used in practice,then makes a new appraisal mechanism which is modified by adding punishment to prevent immoral appraisal and analyze its Nash equilibrium.It shows that effective train and agitprop about performance appraisal will result in a focal point equilibrium according with the goal of performance appraisal.
Keywords:teams  performance appraisal  game  nash equilibrium
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