Analyzing the Welfare Impacts of Full‐line Forcing Contracts |
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Authors: | Justin Ho Katherine Ho Julie Holland Mortimer |
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Institution: | 1. Charles River Associates, , Washington, DC, 20004‐1229 U.S.A.;2. Department of Economics, Columbia University, , New York, New York, U.S.A.;3. NBER;4. Department of Economics, Boston College, , Massachusetts, U.S.A. |
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Abstract: | Theoretical investigations have examined both anti‐competitive and efficiency‐inducing rationales for vertical bundling, making empirical evidence important to understanding its welfare implications. We use an extensive dataset on full‐line forcing contracts between movie distributors and video retailers to empirically measure the impact of vertical bundling on welfare. We identify and measure three primary effects of full‐line forcing contracts: market coverage, leverage and efficiency. We find that bundling increases market coverage and efficiency, but has little impact on one distributor's gaining leverage over another. As a result, we estimate that full‐line forcing contracts increased consumer and producer surplus in this application. |
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