Epistemic democracy with correlated voters |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, Germany;2. Faculty of Economic and Financial Sciences, University of Johannesburg, South Africa;1. Washington University in St. Louis, United States;2. MIT, United States;1. CentER, Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands;2. Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands;3. Netspar, CentER, Department of Econometrics and Operations Research and Department of Finance, Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands;1. Department of Economics and Management, Université de Cergy-Pontoise & THEMA,Cergy-Pontoise, 95011, France;2. Department of Economics, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, 30602, USA;1. LEMMA-Paris 2, Paris, France;2. IUF, Paris, France;3. CES-CNRS-Paris 1, Paris, France;4. PSE, Paris, France |
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| Abstract: | We develop a general theory of epistemic democracy in large societies, which subsumes the classical Condorcet Jury Theorem, the Wisdom of Crowds, and other similar results. We show that a suitably chosen voting rule will converge to the correct answer in the large-population limit, even if there is significant correlation amongst voters, as long as the average covariance between voters becomes small as the population becomes large. Finally, we show that these hypotheses are consistent with models where voters are correlated via a social network, or through the DeGroot model of deliberation. |
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| Keywords: | Condorcet Jury Theorem Wisdom of Crowds Epistemic social choice Deliberation Social network DeGroot |
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