基于低碳设计的创新产品研发契约激励机制研究

在创新产品市场中低碳环保的产品设计受到消费者的极大关注，本文通过构建生产者和研发方之间的研发合作契约机制，激励研发方在设计中提高零部件的绿色度，从而为企业供应链获得更多的市场利润。在研发方绿色研发成本信息为公共信息和私有信息的不同情景下，生产者作为Stackelberg博弈的领导者设计了包含版权支付和版权收益分成两个契约条款的激励机制。研究比较发现，当研发方的绿色研发能力为低水平的概率超过一定比值时，采用不对称信息下的版权甄别契约组合比对称信息下的单一契约更有效，这时生产商和供应链整体能获得更多利润；反之，采用单一契约效果更好。同时，契约激励机制使低碳研发能力水平高的研发方在甄别契约中获得更多利润，而低水平研发方只获得保留利润。

Study on the R&D Contract and Incentive Mechanism forLow-carbon Design of the Innovative Product

The low-carbon and environmental design in the innovative product has attracted more attention in the sale market.By formulating the Research and Development(R&D)cooperation contract between the producer and the researcher,the aim of this paper is to incentive the researcher to improve the greenness of component,and also to get more profit of the new product in sale.Two scenarios are considered in t his paper:the green R&D cost information of the researcher is public or private.Letting the producer be the leader of the Stackelberg game,we design a contract menu including royalty payment and royalty revenue sharing ratio.The result of t he study reveals:when the probability of the lower green R&D level researcher is over the threshold,using the royalty screening contracts menu in the asymmetric information is better off for the producer and the integrated supply chain,than using the single contract in the symmetric information situation.Otherwise,scre ening contract will lose the information rent.At the same time,the researcher wi th higher green technology could get more profit in the incentive mechanism than the lower one,the latter can only get the reservation profit.