| 管理层持股、股利政策与代理问题 |
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| 引用本文： | 董艳,李凤.管理层持股、股利政策与代理问题[J].经济学(季刊),2011(3):1015-1038. |
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| 作者姓名： | 董艳 李凤 |
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| 作者单位： | 西南财经大学经济与管理研究院; |
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| 基金项目： | 西南财经大学“211”工程三期建设项目资助 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文基于2004年至2009年沪市和深市所有发行A股的公司数据,通过建立probit和tobit计量模型,从管理层持股和现金股利政策角度讨论了委托代理关系。研究表明,管理层持股能够增加现金股利支付倾向和力度,但是股权激励只有在持股水平相对较高时才能发挥作用。所以只有进一步完善企业的管理者持股机制,才能更有效地保护资本市场中小投资者的利益。
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| 关 键 词： | 管理层持股 股利政策 代理问题 |
Managerial Ownership,Dividend Policy and the Agency Problem |
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| Dong Yan and Li Feng.Managerial Ownership,Dividend Policy and the Agency Problem[J].China Economic Quarterly,2011(3):1015-1038. |
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| Authors: | Dong Yan and Li Feng |
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| Institution: | YAN DONG FENG LI(Southwestern University of Finance and Economics) |
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| Abstract: | Based on the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2004 to 2009,we establish a series of Probit and Tobit models to analyze the agency problem in China,focusing on the relationship between managerial ownership and dividend policy.Our study suggests that managerial ownership could increase the dividend payouts of firms,especially state-owned companies.However,it is also found that equity compensation is not a perfect way to solve the agency problem.Firms need to impro... |
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