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农村城镇化中中央与地方委托代理机制下的风险探析
引用本文:安增军,胡炎仁.农村城镇化中中央与地方委托代理机制下的风险探析[J].新疆财经学院学报,2011(4):35-39,47.
作者姓名:安增军  胡炎仁
作者单位:[1]福建行政学院,福建福州350002 [2]福州大学,福建福州350002
摘    要:在我国农村城镇化进程中,中央与地方政府构成了委托代理关系。这种关系可能给我国农村城镇化带来风险,如地方政府盲目投资的风险,农民土地关联利益受损的风险,生态环境被破坏的风险以及小城镇产业空洞化风险等。可通过逐步完善地方政府的监督约束机制,建立合理的地方政府激励机制和考评体系等措施降低和化解风险。

关 键 词:农村城镇化  委托代理  风险  中央与地方

An Analysis of Agent Mechanism Between Central Government and Local Government in Urbanization
AN Zeng-jun,HU Yan-ren.An Analysis of Agent Mechanism Between Central Government and Local Government in Urbanization[J].Journal of Xinjiang Finance & Economy Institute,2011(4):35-39,47.
Authors:AN Zeng-jun  HU Yan-ren
Institution:1.Fujian Administrative Institute,Fuzhou 350002,China; 2.Fuzhou University,Fuzhou 350002,China)
Abstract:In the process of rural urbanization in China,the central and local governments constitute the principal-agent relationship.This relationship may be brought to the risk of rural urbanization in China,such as local government blind investment risks,risks associated with the damage to farmers' land interests,the risk of environmental destruction and the risk of hollowing out of small towns and other industries.Therefore,through the gradual improvement of local government oversight and restraint mechanisms,the local government needs to establish a rational system of incentives and other measures to reduce the evaluation and risk mitigation.
Keywords:rural urbanization  agent relationship  risks  central and local government
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