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财政分权与地方政府行为异化
引用本文:张恒龙,康艺凡.财政分权与地方政府行为异化[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2007(6):80-84.
作者姓名:张恒龙  康艺凡
作者单位:上海大学国际工商与管理学院 上海200444(张恒龙),上海社会科学院 上海200444(康艺凡)
摘    要:作为财政体制改革的后果,财政分权导致政府间财政竞争,并改变了财政均等状况。中国国情的特殊性,尤其是官员委任制以及以经济增长为核心的地方政府官员政绩考核体系,使得政府间财政竞争更易导致地方政府财政支出结构呈现结构性扭曲。因此,制订合理的政绩考核标准,并相应调整财政体制是规范地方政府行为的当务之急。

关 键 词:财政分权  政府行为  地方政府
文章编号:1003-5230(2007)06-0080-05
修稿时间:2007-06-15

Fiscal Decentralization and Aberrance of Local Government's Behavior in China
ZHANG Heng-long,KANG Yi-fan.Fiscal Decentralization and Aberrance of Local Government''''s Behavior in China[J].Journal of Zhongnan University of Finance and Economics,2007(6):80-84.
Authors:ZHANG Heng-long  KANG Yi-fan
Abstract:In this article,the authors will analyze the relation between the decentralization of fiscal institution transition and aberrance of local government's behavior in China.As a result of fiscal institution transition,fiscal decentralization induces intergovernmental fiscal competition and deteriorates the fiscal equalization.There are several distinctions of the national situation of China.All of the distinctions determined that fiscal institution transition is dominated by central government and the fiscal competition in China is not as efficient as the one in Western Federalism nations.
Keywords:Fiscal Decentralization  Government's Behavior  Intergovernmental Fiscal Relation
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