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贸易摩擦背景下关税与货币政策反制策略研究
引用本文:卞学字,孙婷,张明志. 贸易摩擦背景下关税与货币政策反制策略研究[J]. 南方经济, 2021, 40(9): 70-89. DOI: 10.19592/j.cnki.scje.390613
作者姓名:卞学字  孙婷  张明志
作者单位:山东财经大学国际经贸学院;山东财经大学经济学院
基金项目:本文受到国家自然科学基金青年项目"量化宽松政策退出对中国经济的风险溢出效应与对策研究"(71803098)、教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"价格扭曲‘红利’弱化对技能溢价的影响研究"(19YJC790119)、山东省自然科学基金青年项目"机会非均等视角下低碳发展约束的就业极化效应研究"(ZR2020QG040)资助。
摘    要:通过将贸易品美元定价约束、外汇噪声交易和关税反制等特征融入两国DSGE模型,文章对贸易摩擦背景下美国进口关税冲击的传导渠道以及中国的关税反制策略与货币应对政策有效性等问题进行了数值分析。研究发现,关税反制措施能够有效地对冲美国加征进口关税对中国实际产出、消费和净出口的消极影响,并有助于抑制人民币实际汇率贬值。若进一步搭配将出口品关税纳入利率调控框架的积极货币政策,对于经济扩张与保持汇率稳定都更加有效。但从长期社会福利角度看,积极货币政策对美国经济也具有明显的正向溢出作用,关税反制则会产生显著的福利转移效应,不采取任何关税与货币应对政策将使中国遭受最大的福利损失。因此,基于"打击最大化、自损最小化"原则,中国应对美国采取坚决有力的关税反击,同时保持货币政策相对中性、克制,以期实现"以战促和"的战略目标。

关 键 词:两国模型  中美贸易摩擦  关税反制  福利分析

Tariff and Monetary Policy Retaliation Strategies under Trade Frictions
Bian Xuezi,Sun Ting,Zhang Mingzhi. Tariff and Monetary Policy Retaliation Strategies under Trade Frictions[J]. South China journal of Economy, 2021, 40(9): 70-89. DOI: 10.19592/j.cnki.scje.390613
Authors:Bian Xuezi  Sun Ting  Zhang Mingzhi
Abstract:By introducing features like USD pricing of tradable goods, foreign exchange noise trading and tariff retaliation into a two-country DSGE model, the paper conducts empirical analysis of China's tariff retaliation strategies and monetary policy coordination under the background of Sino-U.S. trade frictions.The results of numerical simulations indicate that if China doesn't react to the increase of U.S. import tariff and monetary policy doesn't respond to export tariff, the tariff shock will lead to deterioration of China's terms of trade and depreciation of real exchange rate. Domestic output, consumption and net export would also experience decline to a small margin. If export tariff is taken into the monetary policy rules, it would significantly promote the growth of economic output and consumption, but also greater imported inflation in the initial stage of tariff shock, the depreciation range of real exchange rate and volatility of net export will be further enlarged. When China imposes retaliation tariff on U.S. exports, even if the monetary policy rules are not adjusted, it would also effectively hedge the adverse effects of tariff shock, and help to maintain a small surplus of current account while restraining the depreciation of RMB exchange rate. If export tariff is further incorporated into monetary policy rules, it will be more beneficial to promote the growth of real output and consumption, maintain exchange rate stability and moderate expansion of current account. Whether retaliation tariff is carried out or not, the implementation of expansionary monetary policy pegged to export tariff is relatively conducive to generating positive spillovers on U.S. economy.In addition, welfare analysis of U.S. import tariff shows that the strength of tariff retaliation is positively correlated with the improvement of China’s social welfare. This paper summarizes three conclusions based on the comparative welfare analysis: First, if the tariff and monetary policy are not adjusted, the U.S. import tariff shock will lead to significant deterioration of China's long-term welfare; second, with the increase of tariff retaliation intensity, welfare of U.S. continues to decline corresponding to the improvement of China's long-term welfare. That is, tariff retaliation produces obvious welfare transfer effect, which is easier to trigger further confrontation of U.S.; third, regardless of the intensity of tariff retaliation, taking export tariff into the adjustment framework of China's monetary policy significantly improve the welfare level of China and U.S.The conclusions above have distinct policy implications. In face of the determination of U.S. to provoke trade disputes with China despite fierce oppositions from all parties, China should take resolute and effective counter tariffs. In the process of dealing with trade frictions, monetary policy shows strong flexibility: If the primary goal of policy adjustment is to promote economic growth, the export tariff should be included in the interest rate rule combined with tariff retaliation measures, which greatly drive the economic expansion and improve the long-term welfare, but also produce obvious positive spillovers on U.S. economy; If the priority goal is to urge U.S. to terminate trade war, China should maintain the neutrality of monetary policy and just adopt a tit for tat tariff counterattack strategy, which would not only effectively deal with the adverse impact of U.S. import tariff, but also improve the long-term welfare and make U.S. bear negative impact of tariff retaliation, so as to achieve the strategic goal of "promoting peace through war".
Keywords:Two-country Model  Sino-U.S. Trade Friction  Tariff Retaliation  Welfare Analysis  
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