| 国有商业银行激励机制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘晓星.国有商业银行激励机制研究[J].商业研究,2006(17):4-7. |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘晓星 |
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| 作者单位： | 广东商学院,金融系,广东,广州,510320 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然基金项目的部分成果,项目编号:70371035 |
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| 摘 要： | 国有商业银行的所有者(国家)与银行经营者本质上体现为一种委托———代理关系,应用信息经济学的委托———代理理论,对非对称信息条件下国有商业银行的激励机制进行分析,表明国有商业银行的激励合约设计中应包括以激励合同为特征的内部利益激励和以竞争性市场为特征的外部激励两个方面。应采取相应措施,将银行的整体发展与银行经营者(代理人)的自身利益联系起来,使得银行经营者在追求个人利益的同时实现银行所有者的盈利目标。
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| 关 键 词： | 国有商业银行 委托——代理 激励机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-148X（2006）17-0004-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-11-02 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年11月2日 |
On Incentive Mechanism in State-owned Commercial Banks |
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| LIU Xiao-xing.On Incentive Mechanism in State-owned Commercial Banks[J].Commercial Research,2006(17):4-7. |
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| Authors: | LIU Xiao-xing |
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| Institution: | Finance Department, Guangdong Business College, Guangzhou 510320, China |
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| Abstract: | Owner and managers of state-owned commercial banks essentially embody a principal-agent contact.The paper analyzes the incentive mechanism of state-owned commercial bank in asymmetric information condition by means of principal-agent theory of information economics.The paper holds incentive mechanism planning of state-owned commercial bank should include internal benefit incentive characterized by incentive contract and external incentive characterized by competitive market.The paper suggests operating corresponding measures to contact bank entire development with personal benefit of bank manager and make bank manager pursue personal benefit while achieving the profit target of bank owner. |
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| Keywords: | state-owned commercial bank principal-agent incentive mechanism |
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