Incentive compatible contractible information |
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Authors: | Philip Bond |
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Institution: | (1) Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston IL 60208-2001, USA (e-mail: p-bond@northwestern.edu) , US |
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Abstract: | Summary. The paper seeks to characterize what information is always available for contracting, independent of the form of the contract
and the probabilities of different states of nature. The paper denotes such information as contractible. It is established that it is possible to speak uniquely of maximal contractible information. Several characterizations are exhibited. In particular, it is shown that if either (a) punishments are bounded everywhere,
or (b) deviations from truth-telling are either always or never detected, then maximum contractible information coincides
with where is the information partition of agent j. An argument is given for why (b) may be expected to hold.
Received: August 7, 2000; revised version: December 21, 2001
RID="*"
ID="*" I thank Michael Chwe, Douglas Diamond, Lars Stole, Robert Townsend, Nicholas Yannelis and an anonymous referee for
helpful comments. |
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Keywords: | and Phrases:Contractible information Incentive compatibility Information partition Common knowledge Cross-reporting |
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