Understanding Agreements on TRIPS and Subsidies in Tandem |
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| Authors: | Moonsung Kang |
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| Affiliation: | (1) Division of International Studies, Korea University, 5-1 Anam-dong, Sungbuk-gu, Seoul, 136-701, South Korea |
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| Abstract: | We provide a theoretical framework to explain why governments seek stronger protection of IPRs and allow R&D subsidies through
multilateral trade agreements such as the TRIPS Agreement and the Agreement on Subsidies. Our analysis indicates that it is
globally optimal to disseminate knowledge without IPR protection and to subsidize inventive firms when issues of IPR protection
and R&D subsidies are considered in tandem. R&D subsidies are a means of amending for damages to investors’ incentives by
weak IPR protection. In addition, the TRIPS Agreement is understood as a victory of the interests of exporting countries over
those of importing countries.
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| Keywords: | IPR protection R& D subsidies Strategic trade policy WTO TRIPS |
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