外资并购的股权博弈与政策规制——租金分成视角

本文从租金分成角度考察外资并购的股权博弈与政策选择问题。契约不完全和竞争不充分导致的准租金是并购双方股权博弈的经济动因,而外资政策决定了双方的博弈顺序。分析表明:中性外资政策导致静态博弈,均衡股权比例收敛于双方相对能力;偏向性政策导致Stackelberg博弈,均衡股权比例偏离企业相对能力并引发先动方对跟随方的利益剥夺。由于租金规模的变动,行业竞争越不充分、资产专用性程度越低,政策因素的扰动效应越强。因此,通过适当的政策安排控制租金规模可以实现经济增长与产业安全的双重目标。这一研究为中国实行差异化外资政策和投资甄别制度提供了切实的理论依据。

Equity Bargaining in Foreign M&A and Policy Regulation:Rent Sharing Approach

The paper discusses equity bargaining in foreign M&A and host nation's policy choice. According to rent sharing theory,equity bargaining is caused by the quasi-rent which is produced by incomplete contracting and incomplete competition,and the sequence of game is determined by FDI policy. The analysis shows that under neutral policy the equity share negotiated by both parties is restrained by firms' relative capacity,while under bias policy the equity share will depart from the firms' relative capacity,thus...