Preemption,leverage, and financing constraints |
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Authors: | Michi Nishihara Takashi Shibata |
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Institution: | 1. Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University, 1‐7 Machikaneyama, Toyonaka, Osaka 560‐0043, Japan;2. Graduate School of Social Sciences, Tokyo Metropolitan University, 1‐1 Minami‐Osawa, Hachioji, Tokyo 192‐0397, JapanTel.: + 81 42 677 2310;3. fax: + 81 42 677 2298. |
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Abstract: | This paper investigates the interactions between preemptive competition and leverage in a duopoly market. We investigate both a case in which the firms have optimal financial structures, and a case in which financing constraints require firms to finance their investments by debt. Our findings are that the second mover always leaves the duopoly market before the leader, although the leader may exit before the follower's entry. The leverage effects of debt financing can increase the value of a firm and accelerate investment, even in the presence of preemptive competition. Notably, financing constraints can delay preemptive investment and improve firm values in preemptive equilibrium. Indeed, the leader's high leverage due to financing constraints can lower the first-mover advantage and weaken preemptive competition. Especially with strong first-mover advantage, the financing constraint effects can dominate the leverage effects. These findings are almost consistent with the empirical evidence, which shows that high leverage leads to competitive disadvantage and mitigates product market competition. |
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Keywords: | C73 G31 G33 Preemption Duopoly Capital structure Financing constraints Real options |
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