The supercore for normal-form games |
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Authors: | Elena Inarra Ma Concepción Larrea |
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Institution: | Universidad del País Vasco-Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea, Avda L. Agirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain |
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Abstract: | This paper analyzes the supercore of a system derived from a normal-form game. For the case of a finite game with pure strategies, we define a sequence of games and show that the supercore coincides with the set of Nash equilibria of the last game in that sequence. This result is illustrated with the characterization of the supercore for the n-person prisoner's dilemma. With regard to the mixed extension of a normal-form game, we show that the set of Nash equilibrium profiles coincides with the supercore for games with a finite number of Nash equilibria. |
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Keywords: | C70 C71 C72 |
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