Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion |
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Authors: | Sjaak Hurkens Navin Kartik |
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Institution: | (1) Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), Campus UAB, 08193 Bellaterra, Spain;(2) University of California, San Diego, USA;(3) Economics Department, Columbia University, 420 West 118th Street, New York, NY 10027, USA |
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Abstract: | This paper reinterprets the evidence on lying or deception presented in Gneezy (Am. Econ. Rev. 95(1):384–394, 2005). We show that Gneezy’s data are consistent with the simple hypothesis that people are one of two kinds: either a person
will never lie, or a person will lie whenever she prefers the outcome obtained by lying over the outcome obtained by telling
the truth. This implies that so long as lying induces a preferred outcome over truth-telling, a person’s decision of whether
to lie may be completely insensitive to other changes in the induced outcomes, such as exactly how much she monetarily gains
relative to how much she hurts an anonymous partner. We run new but broadly similar experiments to those of Gneezy in order
to test this hypothesis. While we also confirm that there is an aversion to lying in our subject population, our data cannot
reject the simple hypothesis described above either.
Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
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Keywords: | Experimental economics Lying Deception Social preferences |
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