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信息理论与自愿审计动机探究
引用本文:周莉.信息理论与自愿审计动机探究[J].适用技术市场,2010(7):95-96.
作者姓名:周莉
作者单位:武汉科技大学,湖北武汉430081
摘    要:自愿审计动机主要有三个理论假说:代理理论、保险理论和信息理论假说。其中的信息假说利用市场中的信息不对称问题,解释了我国上市公司自愿审计行为产生的原因。结合我国中期财务报告审计制度,分析上市公司的自愿审计动机主要是试图通过自愿购买审计服务,对会计信息进行鉴证,以提高信息的可靠性,与信息假说相符,使审计真正成为会计信息质量的有效保证。

关 键 词:信息理论  自愿审计  审计动机

Study on the Information Theory and Voluntary Auditing Motivation
Abstract:There are three theoretical hypotheses of the voluntary audit motivation: agency theory, insurance theory and signal theoretical hypothesis. Using the information asymmetry problems, the information hypothesis explains the reason of the voluntarily audit behavior of our country's listed companies. Combining the background of our country's interim financial re- porting auditing system, this article analysis that the listed companies' voluntary auditing motivation wants to using purchasing the auditing services voluntarily to attest the accounting information in order to improve the reliability of the information, it is coincide with the information hypothesis, making the audit really become the effective guarantee of the quality of accounting information.
Keywords:information theory  voluntary audit  audit motivation
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