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证券投资基金的委托-代理关系研究
引用本文:冷雪霜.证券投资基金的委托-代理关系研究[J].价值工程,2005,24(6):113-115.
作者姓名:冷雪霜
作者单位:武汉理工大学管理学院,武汉,430070
摘    要:本文对证券投资基金当事人之间的委托—代理关系进行了研究,指出在不存在道德风险和逆向选择的条件下,基金投资者和基金管理人、基金托管人之间利益的一致性,基金管理人和基金托管人的报酬应取决于他们努力的成果。最后讨论了在信息极端不对称的条件下基金管理人和基金托管人成为利益共同体的可能性及应采取的措施。

关 键 词:证券投资基金  委托—代理  信息不对称
文章编号:1006-4311(2005)06-0113-03

The Research to Commission-Agency Relationship of the Security Investment Fund
Leng Xueshuang.The Research to Commission-Agency Relationship of the Security Investment Fund[J].Value Engineering,2005,24(6):113-115.
Authors:Leng Xueshuang
Abstract:This text has carried on research to the commission-agency relationship between the parties of security investment fund, testified the consistency of the interests between fund investor and fund manager,fund caretaker without morals risk and reverse choicing ,pointed out that the remuneration of fund manager and fund caretaker should depend on their achievement hard, discussed finally the measures that should be taken on when fund manager and fund caretaker became the interests community under the condition of extreme information asymmetry.
Keywords:security investment fund  commission-agency  information asymmetry  
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