| Abstract: | The principles of state audit, in particular conceptions of independence, adhered to today in the major Westminster democracies originated in the British state audit reforms of the nineteenth century. State auditors prior to the nineteenth century were not expected to be independent of the executive. Instead, state audit was recognized as an executive function to be under the direct control of the executive. For a brief period in the mid-nineteenth century, parliament was able to take advantage of a succession of weak governments to redirect the loyalties of state audit from the executive to the legislature. Although parliament wanted to be served by a state auditor who would keep it informed of executive spending, it did not alter the dominance of the Treasury over state audit. The executive sought to sustain through a discourse of independence the perception that the controls exercised by the executive over the state auditor did not constitute either a threat to audit independence or result in capture of state audit by the executive. The discourse constructed the image of state audit as a function which was able to work unimpeded and independent of the executive despite a legislative framework which contained significant financial, procedural and staffing controls. |
