Bribe-proof rules in the division problem |
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Authors: | Jordi Mass Alejandro Neme |
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Institution: | aDepartament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica and CODE, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 08193, Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain;bInstituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis, Universidad Nacional de San Luis and CONICET, Ejército de los Andes 950, 5700, San Luis, Argentina |
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Abstract: | The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate one of its subgroups to misrepresent their preferences and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtains a weakly preferred share and all agents in the misrepresenting subgroup obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, and weakly replacement monotonic rules. This class is larger than the set of sequential allotment rules identified in Barberà et al. Barberà, S., Jackson, M., Neme, A., 1997. Strategy-proof allotment rules. Games Econ. Behav. 18, 1–21]. |
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Keywords: | Bribe-proofness Strategy-proofness Pareto efficiency Replacement monotonicity Single-peakedness |
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